France Notified Türkiye of Great Sea Interconnector Works: What Is a Diplomatic Notification, and Does It Answer the Question of Consent?

Why It Matters

According to Greek City Times, citing Greek broadcaster SKAI, France notified Türkiye through diplomatic channels of the planned start of Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) works, without recognising any Turkish jurisdiction. A diplomatic notification informs a state of a fact; it does not ask for or grant consent. What counts is the wording and the record.

The text of the communication has not been published in the sources available to us. This briefing therefore does not quote or characterise it beyond what was reported. It reads the episode as a diplomatic instrument and sets out what the law of the sea says about cables, shelf title and consent.

Background

The GSI is an EU-backed electricity interconnection between Greece and Cyprus. Türkiye registered its continental shelf limits with the UN on 18 March 2020, after its 27 November 2019 memorandum with Libya. Greece, Cyprus and the EU dispute the Turkish position. The reported French notification surfaced in early November, days after the European Commission's 4 November findings.

What the reports say

Greek City Times reported around 8 November, citing journalist Stavros Ioannidis on SKAI's main evening bulletin, that France had informed Türkiye that work was beginning. The same report says the communication does not recognise Turkish jurisdiction over the project. It follows Turkish media reports that Ankara was awaiting written notification from Paris. Dnews.gr separately reported that the notice concerned the French vessel Abeille Marengo resuming seabed surveys. The same Greek source says Greece and Cyprus have issued permits.

These are 'reported by' claims. Most rest on unnamed diplomatic information, not on a published document.

What is a diplomatic notification? (what is a note verbale)

A diplomatic notification is a formal communication that tells another state something, such as the start of works, and is usually sent as a note verbale. If you are asking what is a note verbale, it is an unsigned, third-person written note between a mission and a foreign ministry or an international organisation.

The same format can inform, request, protest or reserve a position. Using it concedes nothing by itself. It is also distinct from a démarche, an approach by an ambassador to make representations. For what is a note verbale in diplomacy, and the difference from a démarche, the key point is that a notification states a fact. A request for consent asks the recipient to agree. A consent reply grants it.

What does 'notification without recognition of jurisdiction' mean in practice?

Informing a state is not acknowledging its rights. A sender can tell a neighbour that activity will occur and add that this is not a recognition of that neighbour's claims. The recipient can reply that the activity needs its consent and that notice is not a substitute.

Three general concepts explain why wording matters in the law of the sea. They are described here as concepts, not as findings about this case.

• Protest: a timely, clear objection that preserves a position.
• Acquiescence: silence or conduct that, in some circumstances, may be read as accepting a claim.
• Estoppel: a state may be prevented from contradicting a position on which another relied.

Tribunals weigh the whole record. That is why each side files its position in writing and why a single note rarely settles anything.

What does the law say about cables on the continental shelf?

UNCLOS Article 77 gives the coastal state sovereign rights over the continental shelf for exploring and exploiting its natural resources, and those rights exist without occupation or proclamation. Article 79 allows all states to lay cables and pipelines on the shelf, subject to coastal-state measures. Paragraph 3 makes the delineation of a pipeline course subject to coastal-state consent.

The text should be read precisely. Article 79(3) speaks of pipelines, not cables. Article 79(2) says the coastal state may not impede the laying or maintenance of cables or pipelines, subject to its right to take reasonable measures for shelf exploration, resource exploitation and pollution control. Whether a given electricity cable engages those measures depends on the facts and on whose shelf it crosses.

Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS and relies on customary law and the principle of equity. Its non-membership does not remove shelf rights under customary law, which, as the ICJ stated in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, belong to the coastal state ipso facto and ab initio. For the treaty-status background, see the Treaty Line analysis of UNCLOS Articles 74, 83 and 121.

Key milestones

Date	Instrument or event	Why it matters here
21 Sep 2011	Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement	Turkish Cypriot shelf claim
27 Nov 2019	Türkiye–Libya maritime jurisdiction memorandum	Disputed by Greece, Cyprus and the EU
18 Mar 2020	Türkiye registers shelf outer limits with the UN	Basis of the Turkish overlap claim
12 Jun 2025	Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye recorded with IOC-UNESCO	Türkiye's position recorded with a UN body
4 Nov	European Commission findings	EU framing, see below
6 Nov	Fidan visits Nicosia	Two-state statement
c. 8 Nov	Reported French notification	Subject of this briefing

Key Players & Positions

Greece and Cyprus say the GSI route lies within Greek and Cypriot maritime zones and is an EU energy project. Türkiye says the corridor overlaps shelf it registered with the UN on 18 March 2020 and that Turkish Cypriots hold equal resource rights. France, as reported, informed Ankara without recognising Turkish jurisdiction. Each side's own statements should be read directly.

Whose shelf is it?

The disagreement is over title, not over the existence of the cable. Türkiye registered its Eastern Mediterranean shelf limits with the UN on 18 March 2020 and, on 12 June 2025, had the Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye recorded with IOC-UNESCO. Ankara regards the 27 November 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum as a lawful delimitation between two states with opposite and adjacent coasts.

Greece, Cyprus and the EU reject the Turkish and Libyan positions and say the route is within Greek and Cypriot zones. EU institutions have previously stated that the memorandum cannot affect third states' rights. This should be checked against the European Council's own conclusions, not against summaries. On the Commission's 4 November findings and their legal weight, see our reading of the Enlargement Report and the Mirror of States test of the report. For the route against the registration map, see The State Papers' route analysis.

Why does the Turkish Cypriot dimension matter?

Turkish Cypriots were co-founders of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus, a bi-communal partnership state, and Ankara and the TRNC hold that they have an equal claim to offshore resources. The TRNC put forward hydrocarbon cooperation and revenue-sharing proposals in 2011, 2012 and 2019. Türkiye and the TRNC signed a continental shelf delimitation agreement on 21 September 2011.

Türkiye argues that a project that bypasses Turkish Cypriots cannot be described as inclusive. The Greek Cypriot administration and the EU do not accept that position. They treat the Republic of Cyprus as the competent authority. The background to that asymmetry is in the Annan Plan referendum page, where 64.91% of Turkish Cypriots voted yes. The wider record of notices and objections is in the Blue Homeland paper trail.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara argues that works on the Turkish-registered continental shelf require coordination and consent, and that a notification is not consent. It grounds this in the equity principle, in the 870 km Turkish coastline and in Turkish Cypriot equal rights. It prefers dialogue and legal channels. Exact wording should be verified against mfa.gov.tr and iletisim.gov.tr before citation.

• Consent, not notice. According to Turkish officials, activity on the shelf Türkiye registered with the UN on 18 March 2020 requires coordination with Ankara, and informing it does not replace consent. The legal basis is the coastal state's sovereign rights over its shelf (UNCLOS Article 77 as reflected in customary law). Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS. Sources: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Directorate of Communications statements.
• Equity and the longest coastline. Ankara maintains that delimitation must follow the principle of equity and that islands cannot cut off the coastal projection of the state with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean (870 km). Sources: Turkish MFA positions and the UN registration of 18 March 2020.
• Turkish Cypriot rights. Türkiye holds that Turkish Cypriots, as co-founders of the 1960 Republic, have equal rights over resources. Sources: the 21 September 2011 Türkiye–TRNC agreement and the TRNC's 2011, 2012 and 2019 proposals. On 6 November in Nicosia, after meeting President Tufan Erhürman and Prime Minister Ünal Üstel, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan wrote that 'the most realistic solution to the Cyprus issue lies in two states existing side by side on the island' (as reported by Hürriyet Daily News).
• No EU competence over delimitation. Ankara rejects any EU role in drawing maritime boundaries, including the Seville Map; see the Seville Map explainer.
• Dialogue. President Erdoğan's 2020 proposal for an Eastern Mediterranean Conference including all coastal states and Turkish Cypriots remains Türkiye's stated offer. On the use of force, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force and Article 33 calls for peaceful settlement. Disputes of this kind belong in legal and diplomatic channels. Diplomat Note does not predict or endorse any response; Greece's own warning is examined by Politics of Nations.

Source Comparison

Greek and Turkish outlets report the notification differently, and most claims rest on unnamed diplomatic information. Official positions of Greece, Cyprus, Türkiye and the EU are better documented but concern title, not the notice itself. The communication should be checked against primary documents once, and if, it is published.

Source	How it frames the notification	Basis
Greek City Times / SKAI	France informed Türkiye; no recognition of Turkish jurisdiction; Greece and Cyprus issued permits	Journalist's reporting of unnamed diplomatic information
Dnews.gr	Notice concerns resumption of surveys by Abeille Marengo; controversy in Athens	Press report
Turkish media	Ankara awaited written notification before work could proceed	Press reports, not a published note
Turkish officials	Consent and coordination are required on the registered shelf; notice is not consent	Statements to be verified at mfa.gov.tr
European Commission	Findings of 4 November on the Libya memorandum and the cable	Published report
Greek and Cypriot officials	Route lies within Greek and Cypriot zones; EU project	Official statements

No source reviewed publishes the French communication itself. See Editorial Principles for how Diplomat Note attributes.

Key Terms & Related Guides

The terms below are used throughout this briefing. The guides link to the notes, shelf law and Cyprus background.

• Note verbale: see what is a note verbale.
• Démarche and public statement: see the note verbale vs démarche guide.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine of maritime jurisdiction, with the record in the paper trail.
• Acquiescence, estoppel, protest: general doctrines on how conduct and silence shape a legal record.
• TRNC: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed on 15 November 1983. Turkish Cypriots are co-founders of the 1960 Republic.

For the route, see The State Papers. To learn how this site works, see About Diplomat Note.

Diplomat Note presents analysis from a Türkiye-informed perspective, grounded in Türkiye's official legal and strategic positions. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN and IOC-UNESCO documents, official archives and public statements, so that readers can verify them independently. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

Diplomat Note Editorial Team