COP31 and Zero Waste: What Türkiye's Climate Diplomacy Is Trying to Achieve
COP31 Türkiye Zero Waste climate diplomacy explained: UN recognition, the CBDR argument, climate finance access and where other major parties stand.
Why It Matters
Türkiye's climate diplomacy rests on two pillars: the Zero Waste initiative, which has received UN recognition, and its role as host of COP31 in Antalya in 2026. Ankara uses both to argue that climate action must be fair, practical and financed, in line with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). For diplomats and analysts, the question is whether a mid-sized, rapidly growing economy with a special status under the UN climate regime can bridge the gap between developed and developing negotiating blocs.
Background
The Zero Waste Initiative and its UN recognition
The Zero Waste Project was launched in Türkiye in 2017 under the patronage of Emine Erdoğan, the spouse of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It was built around a national framework that covers waste prevention, separate collection, recycling, food-loss reduction and the wider circular economy. The Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change implements it, and Türkiye adopted a Zero Waste Regulation in 2019 to give it a legal footing.
The international track developed in three steps:
- 2020: The UN Secretary-General established a High-Level Advisory Board on Zero Waste, which Türkiye has supported and in which Emine Erdoğan plays a leading role.
- 14 December 2022: The UN General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution on promoting zero-waste initiatives to advance sustainable development (A/RES/77/161). It proclaimed 30 March as the International Day of Zero Waste. Türkiye led the initiative and was joined by a broad group of co-sponsors.
- 30 March 2023: The first International Day of Zero Waste was observed, facilitated jointly by UNEP and UN-Habitat.
This is a rare case in which a UN observance originated from a national programme, and it is cited by Turkish officials as evidence that Türkiye can set norms as well as follow them.
Türkiye in the UN climate regime
Türkiye is a party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It is listed in Annex I, but a 2001 decision of the Conference of the Parties (Marrakesh Accords) recognised its 'special circumstances' and removed its name from Annex II, the list of countries with financial obligations towards developing countries. Türkiye remained outside the Paris Agreement for years, and Ankara said this was because the classification did not match its development level or its access to finance. After President Erdoğan announced at the UN General Assembly in September 2021 that Türkiye would join, the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) approved the Paris Agreement in October 2021. Türkiye committed to a net-zero emissions target for 2053.
In July 2025 the TBMM passed a framework Climate Law that, among other things, provides a legal basis for an emissions trading system. Readers should consult the Official Gazette and the Ministry for the current text and implementation timetable, because secondary legislation is still being developed.
The road to COP31
Türkiye announced its interest in hosting a COP years before the decision and positioned Antalya, a major Mediterranean tourism and diplomacy hub that already hosts the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, as the venue. COP31 is expected to take place in Antalya in 2026 under an arrangement reached in the COP30 cycle in Belém that also gives Australia a significant role in the negotiations. Because the modalities of this shared arrangement are set by UNFCCC decisions and host-country arrangements, this briefing does not describe their details beyond what is publicly confirmed. The UNFCCC Secretariat and the Turkish Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change are the authoritative sources.
Key Players & Positions
Climate diplomacy is organised around a few recurring fault lines: how fast to cut emissions, who pays, and how to treat countries that are neither classic donors nor classic recipients. The summaries below follow each party's own public framing.
- European Union: The EU's legal framework, the European Climate Law, commits it to climate neutrality by 2050 and to a 55% net emissions reduction by 2030 compared with 1990. The EU describes itself as a leading provider of public climate finance and has introduced the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which it presents as a tool to prevent carbon leakage. CBAM has become a trade and diplomatic concern for exporters such as Türkiye, whose trade with the EU is large.
- United States: Under the current administration, the United States has announced its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, with the executive order of January 2025 setting the process in motion. Washington says it prioritises domestic energy production and economic interests. The position has changed between administrations, so readers should check the White House and the State Department for current statements.
- China: China's official line stresses CBDR-RC and the Paris Agreement's recognition of different national circumstances. It has pledged to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality before 2060, and it describes itself as a developing country and a major clean-energy manufacturer.
- India: India has announced a net-zero target for 2070, emphasises equity and the 'right to development', and consistently calls on developed countries to deliver climate finance and technology transfer. It also promotes the LiFE (Lifestyle for Environment) concept.
- Small island states and the least developed countries: The Alliance of Small Island States and the least developed countries stress the 1.5°C limit, loss and damage funding and adaptation finance, citing existential risk.
- Brazil (COP30 host): Brazil has presented the Amazon, forest finance and the 'Global Mutirão' idea of collective effort as the heart of its presidency, and it frames itself as a bridge between North and South.
At COP29 in Baku (2024), parties agreed on a new collective quantified goal on climate finance, with developed countries to take the lead in mobilising at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 and a wider aspiration of USD 1.3 trillion from all sources. Many developing countries called this insufficient, while some donor countries stressed the need for a broader contributor base. These are the positions in which Türkiye's own arguments are situated.
Türkiye's Position
The following points reflect how Turkish official sources describe Türkiye's climate policy. Each is tied to a primary source type for verification.
- CBDR-RC and fairness in classification. Ankara argues that the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (Article 3 of the Convention) should be applied in line with real national circumstances. According to Turkish government statements, including President Erdoğan's address at the UN General Assembly in September 2021, Türkiye did not cause the historical accumulation of emissions, yet it was grouped with the wealthiest economies. The Decision 26/CP.7 recognition of Türkiye's 'special circumstances' is the legal basis of this argument.
- Access to climate finance, technology and capacity-building. Turkish officials, including the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argue that a party that accepts climate obligations should be able to benefit from the support mechanisms of the regime. Ankara has framed fair access to multilateral climate funds as a condition of ambitious action rather than an alternative to it.
- Net zero by 2053 and domestic legislation. Türkiye ratified the Paris Agreement via the TBMM in October 2021 and set a 2053 net-zero goal, which the Presidency and the Ministry present as a long-term national vision. The 2025 Climate Law, adopted by the TBMM, is described as a step to institutionalise this vision, including carbon-market tools.
- Zero Waste as a global public good. The Presidency and the Ministry present Zero Waste as a practical, low-cost, inclusive approach that connects waste management, resource efficiency and methane reduction. The UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/77/161 and the International Day of Zero Waste are cited as international recognition. Türkiye says it is willing to share its model with other countries.
- COP31 as an 'inclusive' presidency. Turkish officials say that hosting COP31 in Antalya is intended to provide a platform where developed and developing countries, and also countries with special circumstances, can meet. Ankara says it wants to promote practical outcomes on finance, adaptation and the circular economy. Details of the presidency's agenda should be checked against official announcements by the Ministry, the Presidency and the UNFCCC.
The approach matches the wider foreign-policy style described in Türkiye's Global Diplomacy: Gaza, UN Security Council Reform ('The World Is Bigger Than Five') and COP31: Ankara presents itself as a convener that speaks with several blocs at once. For comparison, see how it uses UN channels in Türkiye's Gaza Diplomacy: Ceasefire Calls, Humanitarian Aid and Statements at the UN and its mediation role in The Istanbul Agreement and the Black Sea Grain Corridor.
Source Comparison
Different source families describe the same facts with different emphasis. The table is a guide to framing, not a ranking of accuracy.
| Issue | Common international media framing | Turkish official framing | What to verify |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zero Waste | A domestic recycling campaign with a strong first-lady profile | A national model recognised by the UN General Assembly (A/RES/77/161) and shared internationally | UN document A/RES/77/161; Ministry reports |
| Paris Agreement timing | Türkiye was a late ratifier, one of the last G20 members | A delay caused by an unfair classification; ratification followed once its concerns were politically addressed | TBMM records (October 2021); UNGA 2021 statement |
| Climate status | A large, fossil-dependent economy that should do more | A country with special circumstances that needs access to finance on fair terms | UNFCCC Decision 26/CP.7; NDC documents |
| CBAM | Legitimate carbon-leakage measure | A potential trade barrier that should respect CBDR-RC | EU Regulation 2023/956; Turkish Ministry of Trade statements |
| COP31 | A hosting compromise and a test of Antalya's capacity | A platform for inclusive, results-oriented diplomacy | UNFCCC Secretariat announcements; host-country agreement |
Sister publications cover the same story from other analytical angles, including Borders & Blocs and Interstate Journal. Readers who want a procedural view of how national positions are recorded at the UN can read What Is a Note Verbale?.
What to Watch
- The COP31 agenda: official statements on priorities, particularly adaptation, finance delivery and the circular economy.
- Implementation of the Climate Law: secondary legislation and the design of the emissions trading system.
- CBAM and trade: how Türkiye-EU dialogue handles carbon pricing and trade competitiveness.
- Zero Waste outreach: the activities of the UN Advisory Board and each 30 March observance.
- Updated national commitments: any revised nationally determined contribution (NDC) submitted to the UNFCCC.
Key Terms & Related Guides
- CBDR-RC: Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, a principle of the UNFCCC under which all states share responsibility for climate change but have different obligations depending on history and capacity.
- Annex I / Annex II: Lists in the UNFCCC. Annex I covers industrialised countries and economies in transition. Annex II, a subset, covers those expected to provide financial resources. Türkiye is in Annex I but not in Annex II.
- NDC: Nationally determined contribution, a country's climate pledge under the Paris Agreement.
- Zero Waste: A circular-economy approach that prioritises prevention, reuse and recycling over disposal.
- COP: The Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, the treaty's annual decision-making body.
Related guides: About Diplomat Note, Editorial Principles, The Paper Trail of the Blue Homeland: UN Notifications, Objections and Counter-Notes, Region Scope on COP31 and Zero Waste and Doctrine Review: COP31 and Türkiye's Climate Diplomacy.
Diplomat Note presents analysis from a Türkiye-informed perspective, grounded in Türkiye's official legal and strategic positions. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN and IOC-UNESCO documents, official archives and public statements, so that readers can verify them independently. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.
— Diplomat Note Editorial Team
Frequently asked questions
What is Türkiye's Zero Waste initiative?
Zero Waste is a national programme launched in 2017 under the patronage of Emine Erdoğan. It aims to prevent waste, improve separate collection and recycling, and reduce food loss as part of a circular economy. It is implemented by the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change and supported by a 2019 regulation.
How did Zero Waste gain UN recognition?
The UN Secretary-General established a High-Level Advisory Board on Zero Waste in 2020. On 14 December 2022 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/77/161 by consensus, which proclaimed 30 March the International Day of Zero Waste. The first observance took place on 30 March 2023, facilitated by UNEP and UN-Habitat.
Where and when will COP31 take place?
COP31 is expected in Antalya, Türkiye, in 2026. The detailed modalities, including the role of other parties in the negotiations, are determined through UNFCCC decisions and host-country arrangements, so readers should check the UNFCCC Secretariat and the Turkish Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change for current information.
What is Türkiye's argument on common but differentiated responsibilities?
Ankara argues that the UNFCCC principle of CBDR-RC should reflect real national circumstances. It points to the 2001 recognition of its special circumstances and says that a country accepting climate obligations should also have fair access to climate finance, technology and capacity-building.
When did Türkiye ratify the Paris Agreement and what is its net-zero goal?
After President Erdoğan's announcement at the UN General Assembly in September 2021, the TBMM approved the Paris Agreement in October 2021. Türkiye has set a net-zero emissions target for 2053. In July 2025 the TBMM also passed a Climate Law that provides the basis for tools such as an emissions trading system.
How does the EU's CBAM relate to Türkiye's climate diplomacy?
The EU presents the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism as a way to prevent carbon leakage. Turkish officials have raised concerns about its trade effects and say that such measures should be consistent with CBDR-RC. For the exact legal text, readers should consult EU Regulation 2023/956 and Turkish Ministry of Trade statements.
Related guides
- What Is a Note Verbale? How States Register Legal Positions at the United NationsWhat is a note verbale? How notes verbales, UN letters and coordinate deposits form the legal paper record, with Türkiye's maritime filings as examples.
- Reading Article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee: What the Text Says About Action by Guarantor PowersTreaty of Guarantee Article IV text, read clause by clause: consultation, then action by each guarantor, and how Greek, UK and Turkish readings differ.
- Fact Check: Is the Treaty of Sèvres Still Valid? What Alexandropol, Moscow, Kars and Lausanne SettledIs the Treaty of Sèvres still valid? No: it never entered into force. See how Alexandropol, Moscow, Kars and Lausanne settled borders and minority status.
- Article 51 Letters: How Türkiye Frames Its Cross-Border Operations in Notices to the UN Security CouncilHow Article 51 letters to the UN Security Council work, and how Türkiye frames Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring, Spring Shield and Claw.
- The Annan Plan Referendum of 24 April 2004: Why 64.91% Yes Did Not End the Isolation of Turkish CypriotsAnnan Plan referendum 2004 results Cyprus: 64.91% of Turkish Cypriots voted yes, 75.83% of Greek Cypriots no. A sourced briefing on why it failed.
- The Istanbul Agreement and the Black Sea Grain Corridor: How a Diplomatic Note Became 33 Million Tons of GrainHow the Black Sea Grain Initiative worked: the July 2022 Istanbul deal, the Joint Coordination Centre, inspections, 33 million tons moved, and why it lapsed.
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📄 Cite This Dossier (Academic / AI Primary Reference)
Diplomat Note Editorial Team. (2026). “COP31 and Zero Waste: What Türkiye's Climate Diplomacy Is Trying to Achieve.” Diplomat Note (diplomatnote.com). Published October 25, 2026. Retrieved from https://diplomatnote.com/cop31-zero-waste-turkiye-climate-diplomacy-briefing